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Abstract
We study how vertical integration in regulated network industries af-
fects the acquisition and transmission of socially valuable information on
demand. We consider a regulated upstream monopoly with downstream
unregulated Cournot competition and demand uncertainty. Demand in-
formation serves to set the access price and to foster competition in the
unregulated segment but demand realizations can be observed at some
cost only by the upstream monopolist; information acquisition is also un-
observable.
We show that vertical integration favours acquisition of demand in-
formation because of the transmission of information generated by the
public nature of the regulatory mechanism. This holds both when access
to information is easier for the upstream firm and when it is easier for
downstream firms.
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1 Introduction
Over the last thirty years, in most network industries there has been a trend
towards the opening of segments of the business to competition. In Europe com-
petition was introduced in the late 1990s whereas liberalization in the US and
Britain has its provenance in the early 1980s. At the same time, the regulator’s
role has been restricted to setting the price at which entrants can obtain access
to the networks and to decide whether to allow the incumbent firm to continue
to operate in the competitive segment.
Access policy and structural reforms have been crucial for the development of
competition in network industries. The price at which entrants can obtain access
to the networks (such as access to electricity distribution or origination and
termination of calls in the case of telecommunications) is a key determinant of
the gains secured by pro-competitive policies. As a result considerable attention
has been devoted to the design and implementation of access pricing regimes
(see Vogelsang 2003 for an in depth discussion).
At the same time, different regulatory measures have been taken with re-
gard to the vertical organization of network industries and in particular the
downstream integration of input suppliers. The structural reforms to combat
dominance and promote competition during the 1980’s and the 1990’s led to a
separation of the transmission grid from generation in the electricity industry
(England and Wales), to a divestiture of transportation service and supply of
gas in the gas industry and to a structural separation of local network from
long-distance market in the telecommunications industry (A&T in the US in
1982). In the US the large integrated utilities that historically have dominated
the electricity industry are undergoing rapid restructuring with federal and some
state policies promoting vertical separation.
Despite these reforms, integration remains a viable option. In the US the
1996 Telecommunication Act, has removed the restrictions that kept the Re-
gional Bell Operating Companies out of the long-distance market. In continen-
tal Europe dominant regulated firms have been left integrated as it has been
viewed it as more appropriate to address competition concerns through action
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by sector regulator (see e.g. Oftel, 2001 and also Cowan, 2001 for an in depth
discussion) and through accounting separation. Accounting separation entails
separate profit statements and balance sheets for the separate entities managing
different segments of the business. Forms of separation intermediate between
structural separation and accounting separation have also been considered.1
In the US existing electricity utilities exhibit enormous structural differences,
ranging from pure distribution to complete integration of generation and distri-
bution.
In the context of a regulated upstream naturally monopolistic sector and a
downstream unregulated sector, the economics literature has shown that ver-
tical integration can be anti-competitive. It can make it difficult to create a
level playing field in the downstream market because of the incentives of the
integrated firm to increase its rivals’ costs. The firm may degrade the quality of
the input to harm downstream competitors (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007)
or it may exaggerate its cost in order to convince the regulator to set a higher
access price (Vickers, 1995).
Vertical integration can however alter the performance of the industry in op-
posite ways. When the access price is greater than the marginal cost of the input,
an integrated firm faces lower cost in the downstream market than its rivals.
This generally yields a greater output in the downstream market and higher
welfare than under separation. Vertical integration can also lead to a reduction
in total fixed costs due to a lower number of suppliers entering the downstream
market, to better coordination between investments in the upstream and down-
stream markets (Vickers, 1995) and to efficiency gains from economies of scope
(Kwoka, 2002).
In this paper, we focus our attention on another aspect of network industries
which may have an impact on the desirability of vertical integration, namely
demand uncertainty. Network industries are characterized by volatile demand
conditions and accurate demand forecasts are critical to the performance of the
1 This is the case of the ‘operational’ or ‘functional’ separation that has been achieved in the
UK and it is increasingly being discussed in Europe. Functional separation entails separate
divisions dealing with separate services (retail and non-retail and access and non-access). See
Cave (2006) for a discussion.
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competitive sector and to ensure coordination of different segments of the in-
dustry.2 In regulated network industries, demand information is also useful for
designing optimal access policy which in turn helps the development of compe-
tition in the unregulated segment. Information however may be accessible more
easily by some firms than by others and incentives to acquire and to transmit
the information may vary with the industry structure.
Consider the electricity sector. Demand information in the electricity indus-
try is needed in order to set capacity requirements and to reduce the risk of
bankruptcy of the entire system and to meet universal service obligations (con-
tinuity of supply in time and space). On account of the demand insensitivity
to price, the rigidity of supply and the properties of electricity transmission, an
imbalance of supply and demand at any one location on an electricity grid can
threaten the stability of the entire grid and disrupt delivery of the product. With
minor exceptions power cannot be stored and must be produced the instant it is
consumed. Failure of generation to meet demand will result in blackouts. How-
ever, as discussed by Borenstein (2002), the demand for electricity is difficult to
forecast. The industrial use of electricity varies with the level economic growth,
the technological change and the number and type of firms using electricity
as an input for their production. The demand of electricity from residential
consumers is affected by weather conditions and the distribution of consumers
type. Consumers of electricity are heterogeneous and some consumers need no
interruption of service whilst others are willing to accept interruptability. De-
mand forecasts thus require costly predictions over the level of industrial use
of electricity and knowledge of the distribution of consumers’ types. To ensure
efficient responses to both predictable and unpredictable events, some policy
analysts have argued that centralized operation of generation and transmission
may be necessary (see e.g., Michaels, 2006).
Accurate demand estimation is critical to good performance also in the
telecommunications industry. Whilst twenty years ago the boundaries of the
telecommunications industry were stable and well defined, now a rapidly chang-
2 A number of studies incorporate uncertainty in the future revenue to be derived from
providing the final good, see for example Clark and Easaw (2007).
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ing technology has generated a supply of rapidly changing mix of services with
a highly fluctuating demand for existing services. Demand information can
then help to design a network compatible with the services offered and to make
adequate investment in infrastructure modernization.3
In this paper we investigate how vertical integration in regulated network
industries affects the acquisition of socially valuable information on demand
and how this in turn affects the desirability of vertical integration. We show
that vertical integration strengthens the incentives of firms to acquire demand
information and that this increases social welfare. This holds both when access
to information is easier for upstream firms and when it is easier for downstream
firms.
We consider a stylized model with an industry characterized by an upstream
market, which is a regulated natural monopoly, and an unregulated downstream
market with Cournot competition, homogenous products and demand uncer-
tainty. Following current practice, we assume that the access charge is the only
instrument available for the regulator to regulate the industry and we consider
optimal access price regulation. The downstream demand is random and infor-
mation on its realization is valuable to the regulator for the choice of the access
price and it is valuable to the downstream firms for the choice of output. We
compare the performance of two industrial structures: integration, where the
upstream firm is integrated with a downstream firm, and separation, where the
upstream firm does not operate in the downstream market.
We start by assuming that information on demand can only be acquired by
the upstream monopolist. In the benchmark case where information is costly
but once acquired it becomes public knowledge, either integration or separation
can be optimal, depending on the parameters but not on the problem of inducing
information acquisition by the upstream firm.
Instead, when information is privately acquired and information acquisition
is unobservable, other things equal, integration does better than separation.
3 Demand information can also affect investment incentives in network quality of competing
operators using the rival’s network for call termination. For a model of invetment in network
quality see Valletti and Cambini (2003).
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With separation, information revelation by the upstream monopolist is cheap
talk and demand information has no value for the upstream monopolist. Only
if the firm operates also in the downstream market will it value information
acquisition. Vertical integration thus makes the payoff of the upstream monop-
olist state-dependent creating value for information acquisition over the realized
state. This result is somewhat in line with empirical evidence. Using a data set
of U.S. electric utilities that differ widely in their degree of vertical integration,
Kwoka (2002) estimates that cost savings from vertical integration are substan-
tial. Among other factors, he finds that demand information matters. There
are economies from scope generated from better information about downstream
load for purposes of determining future capacity requirements. Furthermore,
integration helps to accomplish energy balance at all times by allowing real-
time management of power flows from the generating units and from large users
whose supply may be curtailed to maintain system balance and face unexpected
demand shocks.4
The problem of inducing information acquisition by the upstream monopolist
reverses the result that is obtained in the economics literature when only asym-
metric information matters, result that would also be obtained in our setting
should information acquisition be observable. With observable information ac-
quisition, compared to the benchmark, separation does better than integration.
This is because of an ’informational externality’ that arises when information on
demand is transmitted to the downstream firm via the public nature of the regu-
latory mechanism. When the upstream monopolist produces in the downstream
market, it has incentive to use its information to induce a contraction in the
rival’s output and increase its own downstream profits. In a similar vein the eco-
nomics literature has shown that vertical integration exacerbates the incentives
of the upstream monopolist to misreport cost information (Vickers,1995). Thus
whether or not vertical integration helps the informational problem depends on
whether information is freely available or not.
4 A number of other studies investigate the relationship between the vertical integration of
electricity transmission and distribution and utilities’ cost. Most studies show that vertical
integration improves economic efficiency. See Michaels (2006) for a discussion.
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In the second part of the paper we relax the assumption that only the up-
stream firm can acquire demand information and we consider the possibility of
information acquisition by the unregulated downstream firm. We obtain two
main results. First, we show that incentives to acquire information remain
stronger under integration than under separation because the value of informa-
tion for a downstream firm under separation is lower than the value of informa-
tion for the regulated upstream monopolist under integration. This is due to
the fact that the upstream monopolist is regulated and that, as the regulatory
mechanism is public, the information acquired by the upstream monopolist is
automatically transmitted to its rival in the downstream market. Other things
equal, information transmission reduces the profit of the upstream firm because
it increases the correlation of firms’ strategies in the downstream market. To
compensate the firm for the consequent loss in profits, the regulator must de-
sign an access price schedule that reflects demand changes in such a way as
to reduce overall the correlation of firms’ strategies in the downstream market.
This in turn boosts the upstream monopolist’s incentives to acquire information
compared to an unregulated downstream firm.
In this respect our result stands in contrast with the literature on information
sharing about a common value in an unregulated Cournot market (see Raith,
1996; for a general model). In that context knowledge by a rival firm of its
own profit function leads to higher correlation of strategies and thus reduces the
incumbent’s profit so that there is no incentive for a firm to transmit information
about demand to the rival. In our setting, instead, the opposite occurs because
of the role played by the public nature of the regulatory mechanism.
The second result that we obtain is that information acquisition by a down-
stream firm is less valuable for social welfare than information acquisition by
the upstream monopolist. This is because information acquired by the upstream
monopolist is transmitted to the downstream firms via the regulation mecha-
nism that sets the access price. Instead, information acquired by an unregulated
downstream firm remains private as this firm is unregulated.
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Apart from being related to the literature on vertical integration in regulated
network industries with imperfect competition in the downstream market, our
paper is also related to the literature on information acquisition. The problem of
information acquisition on demand has been so far investigated in unregulated
industries. Hauk and Hurkens (2000) discuss information acquisition in Cournot
markets and compare the case where information acquisition is observable by
the rival and when it is not. Hurkens and Vulkan (2001) study the relationship
between entry decisions and information gathering by potential entrants, whilst
Dimitrova and Schlee (2003) analyze how potential entry affects the incentives
of the incumbent monopolist to acquire information on demand.
The impact of the information acquisition problem on the design and per-
formance of regulatory mechanisms has been analyzed in the case where the
uncertainty is about costs. See for example Cremer Khalil and Rochet, (1998)
for the case of optimal regulation and Iossa and Stroffolini (2002) for the case
of price cap regulation. In Iossa and Legros (2004) instead information acqui-
sition concerns the value of the underlying asset and property rights are shown
to increase incentives to acquire information. We contribute to this literature
by showing how information acquisition problems matter for the organization
of network industries. We also consider information acquisition on demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the
model. In section 3 we discuss the benchmark case where information acquisi-
tion is observable and acquired information can be made public at no additional
cost. Section 4 analyzes the standard case where information acquisition is ver-
ifiable but the information is privately observed by the upstream monopolist,
which also serves as benchmark. Section 5 considers unobservable information
acquisition, whilst section 6 studies information acquisition by the affiliate. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper and provides some policy prescriptions. All proofs
missing from the text are in an appendix
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2 The model
We consider an industry characterized by an upstream regulated natural monopoly
and a downstream unregulated market with Cournot competition, homogenous
products and demand uncertainty. The production in the downstream market
requires an essential input (e.g. an essential facility), produced in the upstream
market. We compare two industrial structures: Integration (I) and Separa-
tion (S). I indicates a situation where the upstream monopolist is allowed to
produce, through a subsidiary, also in the downstream market while under S
it is excluded. The number of firms in the downstream market is fixed and
equal to two in both industrial structures; only one firm - in addition to the
upstream monopolist - owns the technology required to produce the output.
Thus the difference between the two industrial structures is solely that under
S the downstream firm that was subsidiary of the upstream monopolist is now
an independent firm. This allows us to obtain sharp prediction and has no
qualitative impact on our results.
We consider optimal access regulation. The upstream market is regulated
through a transfer given to the upstream monopolist and an access price paid to
the upstream monopolist by the firm(s) in the downstream market for the uti-
lization of the essential input. The technology used to produce the downstream
output is the same under I and S and it only requires the essential input. Thus,
the upstream monopolist’s marginal cost of production of the final good is the
marginal cost of the essential input, since the access price paid by its subsidiary
is just an internal transfer, while for the rival the marginal cost of production
of the final good is the access price. Therefore, there is a cost advantage either
for the upstream monopolist or for the rival firm in the downstream market
depending on whether the regulated access price is greater or lower than the
marginal cost of production of the essential input. We assume that the up-
stream monopolist and its rival are equally efficient in the downstream market
and normalize to zero both the marginal cost and the fixed cost of production.
The downstream market is characterized by a linear inverse demand function:
P (Q, θ) = θ − Q + ε, where θ, with θ ∈
[
θ, θ
]
, is a parameter of adverse
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selection; it has density function f(θ) and distribution function F (θ) satisfying
the following assumption ∂
∂θ
(1−F (θ)
f(θ) ) ≤ 0. f(θ) and F (θ) are common knowledge.
ε is a random error with zero mean. The parameter θ can be interpreted either
as the willingness to pay of consumers with preferences distributed according to
f(θ) or as the level of market demand with realizations distributed according
to f(θ). We denote by θ0 and by σ2 the mean value and the variance of the
distribution of θ, respectively.
The realization of θ can be privately observed at some cost K by the up-
stream monopolist. In most of the paper we assume that information acquisition
is prohibitively costly for the regulator and for the other firms. The regulator
observes quantities and price but he cannot infer the true value of θ because
of the noise ε. The informational advantage of the upstream monopolist stems
from it being the incumbent. In Section 6, we relax this assumption and dis-
cuss the possibility that the downstream firm that was once a subsidiary of the
upstream monopolist retains the technical expertise and know-how to acquire
information on θ also at cost K. In this model, the social value of information
on demand stems from it serving to determine the optimal access price and to
adjust production in the downstream market.
Consider now the payoff of the firms, net of the information-acquisition cost.
Under I, the profit function of the upstream monopolist is given by5
ΠMI = (θ −QI)q
M + aIq
R + TI (1)
where QI = qM + qR and qM and qR denote the quantity produced by the up-
stream monopolist and by the rival firm in the downstream market, respectively.
TI and aI denote the transfer received from the regulator and the access price
paid by the rival. The profit function of the rival is instead
ΠRI = (θ −QI − aI)q
R (2)
Under S, the profit function of the upstream monopolist is given by
ΠMS = aSQS + TS (3)
5 In the rest of this paper Π(.) indicares the expected profit with respect to ε.
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where QS = 2qS and qS denotes the quantity produced by a downstream firm.
TS and aS denote the transfer received from the regulator and the access price
paid by the downstream firms. The profit of a downstream firm is
ΠDS = (θ −QS − aS)qS (4)
The objective function of the regulator is given by the social value of the net
consumer surplus plus the firms’ profits. Let S(θ,Q) denote the gross consumer
surplus, with S′(θ,Q) = P (θ,Q) and S′′(θ,Q) ≤ 0, and let λ > 0 denote the
shadow cost of public funds. The objective function of the regulator under I,
when there is information acquisition, can then be written as
WI = S(θ,QI)− P (θ,QI)QI − (1 + λ)TI +Π
M
I +Π
R
I −K
Under S, when there is information acquisition, the regulator’s objective func-
tion is
WS = S(θ,QS)− P (θ,QS)QS − (1 + λ)TS +Π
M
S + 2Π
D
S −K
The timing of the game is the following. 1) Nature chooses θ; 2) the regula-
tor offers the upstream monopolist the menu of contracts {aI(θ), TI(θ)} under
I and {aS(θ), TS(θ)} under S; 3) the monopolist decides whether to acquire
information on θ by investing K, and it observes θ if it does; 4) the monopolist
decides whether to accept the contract offered by the regulator; the firms in the
downstream market simultaneously choose their quantities; the transfer Th and
the access price ah (h = I, S) are paid.
3 Benchmark 1: costly public information
As benchmark, suppose that information acquisition is observable and infor-
mation can be made public at no additional cost. In this case we show in the
Appendix that for K sufficiently low the optimal regulatory mechanism induces
the upstream monopolist to acquire information, the information is then made
public and used to adjust production in the downstream market and to set the
access price. Comparing I and S we then obtain as follows.
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Proposition 1 Under costly public information, there exists a level of λ, de-
noted by λ
∗
> 0, such that for λ ≥ λ∗, under I expected welfare and the value
of information are at least as high than under S. The opposite statement holds
for λ < λ
∗
.
Under both I and S, the regulator uses the access price to reduce the need for
distortionary taxation and to increase the output of the firms in the downstream
market which is subotimal. A higher access price raises access revenue but lowers
the output in the downstream market. When λ is high, reducing distortionary
taxation is particularly important and thus the social value of the revenue
obtained by the upstream monopolist in downstream market under I is high.
This effect favours I. When λ is low, reducing the level of distortionary taxation
is less important and the main concern of the regulator becomes to increase
production in the downstream market. This calls for a low access price and it
favours S. Overall, either I or S can be optimal, depending on the parameters
but not on the problem of inducing information acquisition by the upstream
firm.
For future references, we denote by a∗I(θ, λ) and a
∗
S(θ, λ) the optimal access
prices under I and under S with costly public information. Further, we let
EW ∗h (θ, λ,K) denote the expected maximum value function under costly public
information and information acquisition and w∗h(θ0, λ) the welfare function un-
der no information acquisition. Finally we use K∗h(λ) to denote the value of K
such that for K ≤ K∗h(λ) the optimal regulatory mechanism induces information
acquisition.
4 Benchmark 2: observable information acqui-
sition with private information
In this section we assume that information acquisition is observable but the
information is privately observed by the upstream monopolist. We assume that
the regulatory mechanism is public information and so is the report θ̂ made by
the monopolist. This is realistic, given the lack of control on the activities of
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regulators if we assumed otherwise.6 In this case, the regulator can demand the
upstream monopolist to incur cost K to acquire information and use a direct
truthful regulatory mechanism of the form: {ah(θ),ΠMh (θ)}, with h = I, S.
4.1 Integration
Under I consider the game that is played in the downstream market. Given
the demand parameter announced by the upstream monopolist θ̂ and the ac-
cess price set by the regulator, aI(θ̂), in the downstream market the upstream
monopolist chooses qM to maximize
ΠMI (θ, θ̂) = (θ − q
M − qR)qM + aI(θ̂)q
R + TI(θ̂) (5)
whilst the rival chooses qR so as to maximize
ΠRI (θ̂) = (θ̂ − q
M − qR − aI(θ̂))q
R
Since in equilibrium θ̂ = θ, the rival learns the realization of demand from
the report of the monopolist and uses it to set its own output. Thus, there
is an informational externality: the information that the upstream monopolist
acquires becomes public through the regulatory mechanism. This affects the
strategy of the rival and, through this, the payoff of the upstream firm.
In particular, from the above two equations the equilibrium quantities pro-
duced in the downstream market for any given level of θ̂ and aI(θ̂) are
qM(θ, θ̂) =
3θ− θ̂ + 2aI(θ̂)
6
; qR(θ̂) =
θ̂ − 2aI(θ̂)
3
and, by substituting for qM(θ, θ̂) and qR(θ̂) in (5), the incentive compatibility
constraints are
IC1 :
∂ΠMI (θ)
∂θ
= qM(θ, θ̂ = θ) =
θ+ aI(θ)
3
> 0
IC2 :
∂2ΠMI (θ)
∂θ∂θ̂
⇒
∂aI(θ)
∂θ
>
1
2
.
6 It is also possible to show that if θ̂ were confidential information, under plausible as-
sumptions ensuring strict monotonicity, its value could be easily inferred from the value of
ah(θ̂).
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The firm has incentives to underreport the realization of θ to benefit from
the increase in downstream revenues when demand is higher. Further, the in-
formational externality raises incentives to misreport. Indeed, suppose that the
rival were informed and set its output on basis of the true realization of θ so that
no informational externality arises. Then, qM(θ, θ̂) = θ+a(θ̂)3 , q
R(θ, θ̂) = θ−2a(θ̂)3
and
∂ΠML (θ, θ̂)
∂θ
= qM(θ, θ̂)−
∂qR
∂θ
(
qM(θ, θ̂)− a(θ̂)
)
=
2θ + 5a(θ̂)
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As in the case where the rival is uninformed, the higher θ, the greater the down-
stream revenues that the upstream monopolist can obtain for any given level of
the rival’s output. This effect is positive and given by qM(θ, θ̂). However, when
the rival is informed, the higher θ the higher its output in the downstream mar-
ket. This in turn generates two effects: it reduces the profits of the upstream
monopolist in the downstream market (−∂q
R
∂θ
qM(θ, θ̂)) and it increases the ac-
cess revenues due to greater output by the rival ∂q
R
∂θ
a(θ̂). The sum of these
two terms is negative. In other words, the informational externality increases
the informative rent that must be granted to the upstream monopolist in order
to induce truthful revelation. The upstream monopolist, by underreporting θ,
prevents the rival from adjusting its output according to the true realization
of θ and so it can benefit from the whole increase in downstream revenues due
to the higher level of demand instead of only a part of it as in the case of an
informed rival.
Consider now the optimal mechanism. Let EΠMI (θ, aI(θ)) denote the ex-
pected rent of the upstream monopolist for given access price, which has to
ensure that the upstream monopolist finds it profitable to acquire information
about θ
EΠMI (θ, aI(θ)) ≥ K ((IR-IA))
and let µ be the non-negative multiplier associated with it.
Lemma 1 Let âI(θ, µ(K)) denote the optimal access price under Integration
and observable information acquisition, where âI(θ, µ(K)) ≤ a∗I(θ, λ) and
∂âI(θ,µ(K))
∂µ(K) >
0 and let also K0I ≡ EΠ
M
I (θ, âI(θ, µ = 0)) and K̂
1
I ≡ EΠ
M
I (θ, âI(θ, µ = λ))
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with K̂1I > K̂
0
I . Under observable information acquisition: (i) for K ≤ K̂
0
I ,
µ(K) = 0; (ii) for K ∈ (K̂0I , K̂
1
I ), µ(K) solves EΠ
M
I (θ, âI(θ, µ)) = K; with
µ(K) ∈ (0, λ) and µ′(K) ≥ 0; and (iii) for K ≥ K̂1I , µ(K) = λ.
When K is low (i.e. K < K̂0I ), the expected rent - evaluated at a
∗
I(θ, λ)
- is greater than K. Thus the (IR − IA) constraint is slacking and we are in
a standard adverse selection problem. To reduce this rent, which has a social
cost of λ, the regulator introduces a downward distortion in the access-price
schedule with respect to the perfect information allocation for all θ < θ. This
leads to âI(θ, µ = 0). As K rises, eventually it reaches a level, K̂
0
I , where the
expected rent, evaluated at âI(θ, µ = 0), is equal to K. From this value of K
onwards, the (IR− IA) constraint starts to be binding. Thus there is no longer
a need to minimize the informative rent, and in fact, the firm needs to receive
an additional transfer to help it cover the cost of acquiring information. The
distortion in the access price is gradually reduced, and as K reaches the value
K̂1I , the access price schedule returns to its full information level, a
∗
I(θ, λ). For
even higher K, the firm is compensated for the information acquisition cost with
an increase in the monetary transfer.
Let ŴI(θ, λ,K) denote the maximum value function under observable infor-
mation acquisition when there is information acquisition and EŴI(θ, λ,K) its
expectation. If instead there is no information acquisition, the maximum value
function is given by w∗I (θ0, λ). We denote by K̂
∗
I the level of K such that for
K > K̂∗I information acquisition is suboptimal. Since EŴI(.) ≤ EW
∗
I (.), we
have K̂∗I ≤ K
∗
I (λ).
Now consider how the unobservability of θ affects the performance of regula-
tion. Let ∆̂I(.) ≡ max{EW ∗I (θ, λ,K), w
∗
I (θ0, λ)}−max{EŴI(θ, λ,K), w
∗
I (θ0, λ)}
and without loss of generality consider the case where K̂1I ≤ K
∗
I (λ). The fol-
lowing lemma is then obtained.
Lemma 2 Asymmetric information reduces expected welfare under Integration
for all K < K̂1I , whilst it has no effects for K ≥ K̂
1
I . In particular: (i) ∆̂
I(K) >
0; with ∂∆̂
I(K)
∂K
= µ(K)− λ < 0 for all K < K̂1I ; (ii) ∆̂
I(K) = 0 for K ≥ K̂1I .
Lemma 2 is easily understood in light of the fact that for K < K̂1I infor-
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mation acquisition is optimal but it is costly in terms of expected rent due to
asymmetric information. For K ≥ K̂1I , the rent is insufficient to cover informa-
tion acquisition cost. The constraint (IC1) starts to slack, whilst the (IR−IA)
starts to bind as under costly public information leading to EW ∗I (θ, λ,K) =
EŴI(θ, λ,K). It also follows from this that K̂∗I = K
∗
I (λ).
4.2 Separation
Following the same reasoning as under I, consider the game played in the down-
stream market when the value of demand parameter announced by the upstream
monopolist is θ̂. Anticipating that in equilibrium θ̂ = θ, a downstream firm
chooses qS so as to maximize
ΠDS (θ̂) = (θ̂ − 2qS − aS(θ̂))qS
yielding qS(θ̂) =
θ̂−aS(θ̂)
3 and profit for the upstream monopolist equal to
ΠMS (θ̂) = aS(θ̂)2qS(θ̂) + TS(θ̂) (6)
It follows that ∂Π
M
S
(θ)
∂θ
= 0, i.e., the profits of the upstream monopolist are
independent of the true realization of θ. Intuitively, under S the profits of the
upstream monopolist are equal to the access revenues which only depend on the
quantities produced by the downstream firms. These quantities are in turn in-
dependent of θ : since the downstream firms are ignorant, their output decisions
are taken on the basis of the reported realization of θ and not of its true realiza-
tion. It follows that, for any reported realization of θ,the upstream monopolist’s
profits obtainable under the corresponding regulatory contract
{
aS(θ̂), TS(θ̂)
}
are the same, whatever the true realization of θ; hence, the upstream monopolist
has no incentives to misreport the value of θ. The regulator can then extract the
private information about the true realized level of demand from the upstream
monopolist at no cost and the optimal mechanism is the same as it is under
costly public information.
This result is due to the informational externality generated by the public
nature of the regulatory mechanism which, as under I, transmits information
to the uninformed downstream firms. However, under S as opposed to I, this
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informational externality works in favour of the truthful reporting of θ. Indeed,
suppose for a moment that the downstream firms were informed and set their
outputs according to the true realization of θ. The upstream monopolist’s profit
function would become
ΠMS (θ, θ̂) = a(θ̂)Q(θ, θ̂) + TS(θ̂)
with Q(θ, θ̂) = 2θ−2a(θ̂)3 and
∂ΠMS (θ, θ̂)
∂θ
= a(θ̂)
∂Q
∂θ
> 0
That is, by underreporting θ the incumbent could gain greater access rev-
enues corresponding to the true realization of θ. Therefore, with no information
transmission, it would be costly for the regulator to extract information about
demand from the upstream monopolist.
Let EŴS(θ, λ,K) denote the expected maximum value function under ob-
servable information acquisition when the upstream monopolist acquires infor-
mation. In light of the above we have
EŴS(θ, λ,K) = EW
∗
S(θ, λ,K) (7)
For K > K̂∗S there is no information acquisition and the maximum value
function is given by w∗S(θ0, λ); it follows from (7) that K̂
∗
S = K
∗
S(λ). Let
∆̂S(.) = max {EW ∗S(θ, λ,K), w
∗
S(θ0, λ)}−max{EŴS(θ, λ,K), w
∗
S(θ0, λ)}denote
the welfare effect of asymmetric information under S.
Lemma 3 ∆̂S = 0 for all K: under Separation, asymmetric information has
no effect on welfare.
4.3 Comparison
From Lemmas 2 and 3 we have seen that for all K < K̂1I asymmetric information
creates a distortion in the optimal mechanism under I but not under S, whilst
for all K ≥ K̂1I under both I and S there is no distortion. The Proposition
below is then obtained.
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Proposition 2 When information acquisition is costly but observable, asym-
metric information on demand generates a bias in favour of Separation for all
K < K̂1I , whilst it has no effect on the welfare comparison between Integra-
tion and Separation for all K ≥ K̂1I . The bias in favour of Separation over
the range K < K̂1I decreases with K. In particular: (i) ∆̂I(K) − ∆̂S > 0 and
∂(∆̂I(K)−∆̂S)
∂K
= µ(K)− λ < 0 for K < K̂1I , where µ(K) is defined in Lemma 1.
(ii) ∆̂I(K)− ∆̂S = 0 for K ≥ K̂1I .
5 Unobservable information acquisition
5.1 Integration
In this section we consider the case where information acquisition is unobserv-
able. An additional constraint needs to be added to the regulator’s maximization
program (PL-1) compared to the case where information acquisition is observ-
able. This is the incentive compatibility constraint on information acquisition,
(IC − IA), which ensures that, under the optimal mechanism, the upstream
monopolist prefers to incur K to become informed about the realization of θ
rather than remain uninformed.
In this context, it is easy to show that with linear demand function an
uninformed upstream monopolist would choose the contract corresponding to
the mean of the distribution of θ : {a(θ0), T (θ0)} . By using equations (IC1)
and (12), the (IC − IA) is then given by7
EΠMI (θ)−Π
M
I (θ0) =
∫ θ
θ
θ+ aI(θ)
3
(1− F (θ)−Υθ<θ0)dθ ≥ K (IC-IA)
where Υ is a dummy variable with Υ = 1 if θ < θ0 and Υ = 0 if θ ≥ θ0. Let
ν denote the non-negative multiplier of the (IC − IA), we obtain the following
Lemma.
Lemma 4 Let K˜I =
1
6(1+
∂â
I
(θ,µ=0)
∂θ
)σ2 < K0I . Let a˜I(θ, ν) denote the optimal
access price schedule under Integration and unobservable information acquisi-
tion, where a˜I(θ, ν) > âI(θ, µ) for θ > θ0 and a˜I(θ, ν) < âI(θ, µ) for θ < θ0.
Under Integration and unobservable information acquisition: (i) ν(K) = 0 for
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K ≤ K˜I , (ii) ν(K) ∈ (0, λ] and solves
EΠMI (θ, ν)−Π
M
I (θ0) = K (8)
with ν′(K) > 0 and v(K) ≥ µ(K), for K > K˜I .
Information is valuable to the upstream monopolist since it yields an infor-
mative rent. For K ≤ K˜I this informative rent is sufficient to induce information
acquisition, the (IC-IA) constraint is slack, and the optimal mechanism remains
the same as under observable information acquisition. Instead, from K˜I onwards
the (IC-IA) constraint starts to be binding and the optimal mechanism needs to
be modified. Depending on whether θ is greater or smaller than θ0 an increase in
aI(.) has one or two (opposing) effects on the value of information. An increase
in aI(.) increases EΠMI (θ) by (1− F (θ)) and eases the information constraint,
but for θ ∈ (θ ,θ0) a unit increase in aI(.) increase also ΠMI (θ0) by a unit and
makes the information constraint tighter. Therefore a˜I(θ) is higher than âI(θ)
for large values of θ and smaller for low θ which implies a discontinuity at θ0.
Let W˜I(θ, λ,K) denote the maximum value function under unobservable
information acquisition when information acquisition is induced, and let EW˜I(.)
denote its expectation. From Lemma 4, we have that EW˜I(.) is decreasing in
K and there exists a K˜∗I such that for K ≤ K˜
∗
I there is information acquisition
and EW˜I(.) is obtained, whilst for K > K˜
∗
I there is no information acquisition
and the maximum value function is given by Ew∗I (θ0, λ) = w
∗
I (θ0, λ), where it
is immediate that K˜∗I ≤ K̂
∗
I .
Let ∆˜I(.) = max{EŴI(.), w
∗
I (θ0, λ)} −max{EW˜I(.), w
∗
I (θ0, λ)}, that is ∆˜I
denotes the welfare difference under I between the case where information ac-
quisition is observable and the case where it is not observable.
Lemma 5 Under unobservable information acquisition, (i) ∆˜I = 0 for K ≤
K˜I ; (ii) ∆˜I(K) > 0, with
∂∆˜I(K)
∂K
= ν(K) − µ(K) for K ∈ (K˜I ,K
∗
I (λ)], (iii)
∆˜I(K) = 0 for K > K
∗
I (λ).
When K is low (case (i) in the Lemma), the unobservability of informa-
tion acquisition does not induce any welfare loss since the firm has incentives
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to acquire information in order to gain the informational rent. However, as
K increases (case (ii)) inducing information becomes costly. The (IC − IA)
constraint starts to bind and the regulator starts to distort the mechanism in
order to provide the firm with incentives to acquire information. When K in-
creases even further (case (iii)) information acquisition becomes so costly that
it is preferable for welfare not to induce it.
5.2 Separation
Consider the value of information for the upstream monopolist under S. Recall
that when the downstream firms are ignorant the upstream monopolist’s profit
is independent on θ,
∂ΠM
S
∂θ
= 0, which as we have seen implies that there is no
gain for the upstream monopolist from misrreporting the value of the demand
parameter. Whilst this is a positive result for the regulator when information
acquisition is observable, it becomes problematic when information acquisition
is not observable, as the lemma below emphasizes.
Lemma 6 Under unobservable information acquisition the upstream monopo-
list never acquires information under Separation.
Intuitively, since the monopolist cannot extract any informative rent from
acquiring information under S, it will have no incentives to invest K in or-
der to learn the value of θ, or to put it differently, since the monopolist does
not produce in the downstream market, information revelation is a cheap talk
game. It follows from the above lemma that the optimal regulatory mecha-
nism will be given by {a∗S(θ0, λ),Π
∗
S(θ0)}, leading to an expected welfare of
EW˜S(θ, λ,K) = w
∗
S(θ0, λ). Then, letting ∆˜S(.) = max{EŴS(.), w
∗
S(θ0, λ)} −
max{EW˜S(.), w∗S(θ0, λ)}, we obtain the lemma below.
Lemma 7 (i) ∆˜S (K) > 0, for all K ≤ K
∗
S(λ), with
∂∆˜S(K)
∂K
= −(1 + λ) ii)
∆˜S = 0 for all K > K∗S(λ).
Since there is no information acquisition under S, a welfare loss due to
the unobservability of information acquisition will arise whenever information
acquisition is socially desirable, i.e. whenever K ≤ K∗S(λ).
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5.3 Comparison
We now study how the unobservability of information acquisition affects the
performance of the two regimes, I and S, compared to a situation where in-
formation acquisition is observable by the regulator. The proposition below
summarizes our main result.
Proposition 3 (i) If λ ≤ λ∗, unobservability of information acquisition creates
a bias in favour of Integration (i.e., ∆˜I(K) ≤ ∆˜S(K)) and this bias is non-
increasing in K; (ii) If λ > λ∗, there exists a level of K, denoted by K∗, where
K∗ ∈ (K˜I , K˜
∗
I ) such that for K ≤ K
∗ unobservability of information acquisition
creates a bias in favour of Integration (i.e., ∆˜I(K) ≤ ∆˜S(K)) and this bias is
non-increasing in K. For K > K∗ unobservability of information acquisition
creates a bias in favour of Separation (i.e., ∆˜I(K) ≥ ∆˜S(K)) and this bias is
non-decreasing in K for K ≤ K∗S(λ).
The above proposition follows from a combination of two effects. First, as we
have seen in the previous section, it is easier to induce information acquisition
under I than under S. Ceteris paribus this creates a bias in favour of I. Intu-
itively, inducing information acquisition is easier under I than under S because
information on θ is more valuable to the firm when it can use this information
also to choose output in the product market (as under I) than when it cannot
(as under S). Second, the value of information acquisition depends on λ. If
λ ≤ λ∗ information acquisition is more valuable under S than under I (since
K∗S(λ) ≥ K
∗
I (λ), and K̂
∗
S ≥ K̂
∗
I ) and thus more is lost from lack of information
under S compared to I. These two effects go in the same direction and explain
point (i). Instead, if λ > λ∗, information acquisition is more valuable under I
than under S (since K∗S(λ) < K
∗
I (λ)) and the two effects go in opposite direc-
tion. Then, for low K information acquisition is valuable under both I and S
and a bias arises in favour of I. For high K the opposite is true. This explains
point (ii).
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6 Information acquisition by the affiliate
Until now we have assumed that the upstream monopolist is the only firm
that, at cost K, can acquire information on the realization of θ. However, if we
take into account that one of the two downstream firms was an affiliate of the
upstream monopolist before the separation, it seems possible that also this firm
will have the technology and the know-how to acquire information on θ. In this
section we allow for this possibility.
We let the cost of information acquisition for the downstream firm be K
and we assume again that information acquisition is unobservable. Contrary
to the upstream monopolist, the downstream firm is unregulated and thus the
information it acquires will not be transmitted to its rival neither will it be used
to set the access price.
Under unobservable information acquisition, the optimal mechanism is the
same as when the downstream firm cannot acquire information, and it is given
by {aS(θ0),Π
M
S (θ0)}. This is because the total output is linear in aS and the
regulator does not know θ at the time of choosing the regulatory mechanism.
In light of this, we derive the incentives of the downstream firm to ac-
quire information. It is easy to show that qNS (θ0, aS) =
θ0−aS
3 is the quan-
tity produced by an uninformed firm when also the rival is uninformed, whilst
qS(θ, θ0, aS) =
θ
2 −
θ0
6 −
aS
3 is the quantity produced by the downstream firm
when it acquires information and the rival is uninformed.
Denoting by ΠDS (θ, θ0, aS) the maximum value function of the downstream
firm when it acquires information and the rival is uninformed and by ΠDS (θ0, aS)
the expected profit of the firm when it does not acquire information, we obtain
the value of information for the downstream firm when the rival is ignorant
EΠDS (θ, θ0, aS)−Π
D
S (θ0, aS) =
∂2ΠDS (θ, θ0, aS)
∂2θ
σ2
2
=
σ2
4
(9)
which leads us to the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The incentives to acquire information of the affiliate under Sep-
aration are lower than the incentives to acquire information of the upstream
monopolist under Integration; the affiliate acquiring information on θ for all
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K ≤ K˜S, where K˜S =
σ2
4 < K˜I .
Before discussing the intuition behind the above proposition we state a re-
lated corollary.
Corollary 1 Unobservability of information acquisition creates a bias in favour
of Integration also when the affiliate can acquire information.
Since the downstream firm is not regulated, its information cannot be used
to set the access price which will therefore be set on the basis of the expected
value of θ. Further, the access price cannot be used as an instrument to increase
the firm’s incentives to acquire information. The value of information for the
downstream firm is given only by the profitability of adjusting its output level
to the realized level of demand. For K ≤ K˜S, this effect induces information
acquisition. However, K˜S < K˜I (where K˜I is defined in Lemma 4) that is, the
value of information for the downstream firm under S is smaller than the value of
information for the upstream monopolist under I. This is a consequence of the
fact that the upstream monopolist is regulated and the regulatory mechanism
is public knowledge whilst the downstream firm is not regulated as we explain
below.
The value of information for either firm is proportional to the sensitivity of
its output to θ since ∂
2Πi(.)
∂2θ
= −∂q
i
∂θ
. Under I the acquisition of information has
three effects on the upstream monopolist’s output: a direct effect, arising from
the adjustment of its output level to the true realized level of demand, and two
indirect effects, arising from the transmission of information to the rival through
the regulatory mechanism.
The first indirect effect is due to the rival adjusting its output to the realized
value of demand: the greater θ, the greater the rival’s output. This effect
increases the correlation of firms’ strategies and thus reduces the sensitivity of
the upstream monopolist’s output to θ. However, the second indirect effect
works in an opposite direction and more than compensates the first one. This
is due to the incentive compatibility of the regulatory mechanism. Incentive
compatibility requires that the sensitivity of the regulated access price be high
enough to make the rival’s quantity decrease with θ.
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To see this, rewrite the (IC2) constraint under I as
∂2ΠMI (θ)
∂θ∂θ̂
= −
1
2
∂qR(θ)
∂θ
= −
1
6
(
1− 2
∂aI(θ)
∂θ
)
> 0 (10)
with
∂aI(θ)
∂θ
>
1
2
⇐⇒
∂qR(θ)
∂θ
< 0
The access price structure must reflect changes in demand in such as way a
to reduce the correlation of firms’ strategies in the downstream market and
more than compensate the loss in profits due to the transmission of information
generated by the public nature of the regulatory mechanism. Instead, under
S the information acquired by the unregulated downstream firm, remaining
private, is only used to adjust its output to the true realization of θ without
affecting its rival’s output.
Therefore, on account of the informational externality generated by the reg-
ulatory mechanism, the sensitivity of the upstream monopolist’s output to θ
under I is greater than the sensitivity of the informed downstream firm’s output
under S.8 As a result, K˜S < K˜I : a regulated upstream monopolist has stronger
incentives to acquire information than an unregulated downstream firm.Not
only does the affiliate have weaker incentives to acquire information than an
upstream monopolist but also, when the affiliate acquires information it does
so privately. No socially valuable information transmission to either the rival or
the regulator takes place.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the desirability of allowing an upstream monopolist
to operate in the downstream market (Integration) rather than to exclude it
(Separation), in the presence of costly demand information. We have shown that
asymmetric information on demand favours Separation but unobservability of
information acquisition favours Integration. When information on demand can
8 .In particular, let qi = θ−q
R
2
be the output chosen under Cournot competition by the firm
who acquires information, with i = M under I and i = D under S, and with qR = θ−2a(θ)
3
denoting the output of the rival. Then the sensitivity of output of the upstream monopolist
firm with respect to θ is given by: 1
2
(
1− ∂q
R
∂θ
)
, whilst the sensitivity of output of the
downstream is 1
2
, since information is not passed onto the rival.
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only be acquired by the upstream monopolist, inducing information acquisition
is easier under Integration than under Separation because demand information
is more valuable to the firm when it can also use this information to choose
its output in the product market (as under I) than when it cannot (as under
S). Integration is then more likely to be preferable to Separation in industries
where demand is uncertain and lack of information on demand can generate
very costly service disruptions.
We have also shown that unobservability of information acquisition favours
Integration also in the case where information on demand can be acquired by the
downstream firm under Separation. This is due to the fact that the upstream
monopolist is regulated while the downstream firm is not and that the regulatory
mechanism is public knowledge which generates an informational externality
that boosts incentive for information acquisition.
Our results imply that the presence of costly but valuable information on
demand in network industries provides an argument in favour of vertical Inte-
gration of a regulated input supplier. However, if Separation is preferable to
Integration for other reasons not analyzed here, information acquisition issues
require to regulate the downstream firm (instead of the upstream monopolist)
that is most able to acquire information.
We have focused on the case where the number of firms is the same under
both Integration and Separation. An extension of our analysis could be to study
how the cost of acquiring that technology may affect entry decisions.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Under I, maximization of (1) w.r.t. qM and of (2)
w.r.t. qR yields the equilibrium variables in the downstream market as function
of θ and aI
qM(θ, aI) =
θ + aI
3
; qR(θ, aI) =
θ − 2aI
3
;QI(θ, aI) =
2θ− aI
3
;PI(θ, aI) =
θ + aI
3
Similarly, under S maximization of (3) w.r.t. qS yields
qS(θ, aS) =
θ − aS
3
;QS(θ, aS) =
2θ − 2aS
3
;PS(θ, aS) =
θ + 2aS
3
Let wI(θ, aI , λ) = S(θ,QI)+λPIqM +λaIqR and wS(θ, aS, λ) ≡ S(θ,QS)+
λaSQS, we can write the regulator’s maximization program as as
maxWh(θ, ah,Π
M
h , λ,K) ≡ wh(θ, aI , λ)− λΠ
M
h −K h=I,S
s.t. :
EΠMh (θ)−K ≥ 0, h=I,S
ΠMh (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ"
[
θ, θ
]
h=I,S
We then obtain EΠMh (θ) = K and
a∗I(θ, λ) =
(5λ− 1)θ
1 + 10λ
a∗S(θ, λ) =
θ (3λ− 1)
2 + 6λ
with a∗h(θ, λ) increasing in λ.The expected welfare from information acquisition
under costly public information is then
EW ∗h(θ, λ,K) = Ewh(θ, a
∗
h(θ, λ), λ)− (1 + λ)K (11)
Instead, if information acquisition does not occur, the expected welfare is
Ew∗h(θ0, λ) = w
∗
h(θ0, λ), where w
∗
h(θ0, λ) ≡ Ewh(θ, a
∗
h(θ0, λ), λ), due to lin-
ear demand. It follows that under I, information acquisition is optimal if
Ew∗I (θ, λ)−w
∗
I (θ0, λ) ≥ (1 + λ)K. By using Taylor expansion
Ew∗I (θ, λ)−w
∗
I (θ0, λ) =
∂2wI(θ, λ)
∂2θ
σ2
2
=
1 + 8λ+ 5λ2
2(1 + 10λ)
σ2
26
which implies that information on demand is socially valuable for K ≤ K∗I (λ) =
1+8λ+5λ2
2(1+λ)(1+10λ)σ
2. Similarly, under S information on demand is socially valuable
for K ≤ K∗S(λ) =
(1+λ)
2(1+3λ)(1+λ)σ
2 to K∗I .
Now note that W ∗S(θ, λ,K) =W
∗
I (θ, λ,K) at λ = 0, and
dW∗I (θ,λ,K)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
=
−θ2,
dW∗
S
(θ,λ,K)
dλ
∣∣∣
λ=0
= −θ2
2
which implies W ∗S(θ, λ,K) > W
∗
I (θ, λ,K) in a
neighborhood of λ = 0. Tedious calculations then give d
2W∗
I
(θ,λ,K)
dλ2
−d
2W∗
S
(θ,λ,K)
dλ2
=
b, where b is a positive constant, which implies that there exists a λ
∗
> 0, in-
dependent of θ, such that W ∗S(θ, λ,K) < W
∗
I (θ, λ,K) for all λ > λ
∗, and vice
versa. From the above EW ∗S(θ, λ,K) − w
∗
S(θ0, λ) = EW
∗
I (θ, λ,K) − w
∗
I (θ0, λ)
at λ = 0 and λ = λ∗, i.e. K∗S(λ) = K
∗
I (λ) at λ = 0, λ = λ
∗. Furthermore
from the definition of K∗S(λ) and K
∗
I (λ) it easy to show that they are con-
tinuous non-increasing functions of λ with
∣∣∣∂K∗S(λ)∂λ ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∂K∗I (λ)∂λ ∣∣∣ at λ = 0 and∣∣∣∂K∗S(λ)∂λ ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂K∗I (λ)∂λ ∣∣∣ at λ = λ∗; so the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 1 Using standard techniques, from (IC1), we obtain the
expected rent of the upstream monopolist
EΠMI (θ, aI(θ)) = Π
M
I (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
θ + aI(θ)
3
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
dF (θ) (12)
The regulator’s problem is then to determine, for each θ, the couple (âI(θ), Π̂
M
I (θ))
which solves
max
aI(θ),ΠMI (θ)
∫ θ
θ
WI(θ, aI(θ),Π
M
I (θ), λ,K)dF (θ) (PL-1)
s.t. : (IR− IA), (IR), (IC1)(IC2)
where in (IR−IA), the expected rent is given by (12). Since the objective func-
tion of program (PL-1) is strictly concave and the constraint (IR−IA) is linear
in aI and in K, the problem is convex with an unique solution. Neglecting for
the moment constraint (IC2), maximization of the the Lagrangian of program
(PL-1) w.r.t. a yields
−(1 + 10λ)âI(.)− θ+ 5λθ − 3(λ− µ)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
= 0
where the SOC and constraint (IC2) are satisfied provided that −32+5λ−3(λ−
µ) ∂
∂θ
( 1−F (θ)
f(θ) ) ≥ 0. Now, consider the case where (IR− IA) is not binding and
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µ = 0. Substituting for aI = âI(θ, µ = 0) in (12) we obtain K̂0I . Thus, µ = 0
is the solution for K ≤ K̂0I . Substituting for aI = âI(θ, µ = λ) in the same
equation, we obtain K̂1I .
(i) Since WI() is strictly concave and the (IR − IA) constraint is linear in
aI and in K, it follows that its value function, denoted by EŴI , is concave in
K and µ(K) = −∂EŴI(.)
∂K
− 1. Given the concavity of EŴI(.), µ(K) is a non-
decreasing function of K; for K ≤ K̂0I , EŴI(.) is linear in K and µ(K) = 0.
(ii)To see that µ ≤ λ, consider an increase dK in K; a (suboptimal) feasible
response by the regulator that would maintain all the constraints satisfied would
be to increase all the transfers by dK and to keep the same access price schedule
This would decrease its payoff by (1+λ)dK. Therefore we have EŴI(θ, λ,K+
dK) ≥ EŴI(θ, λ,K) − (1 + λ)dK and so
∂EŴI(.)
∂K
≥ −(1 + λ).(iii) Since, for
K ≥ K̂1I , âI(θ˜, µ = λ) = a
∗
I(θ, λ) we have EŴI(θ, λ,K) = EW
∗
I (θ, λ,K)
Proof of Lemma 2. In light of Lemma 1 we have
EŴI(θ, λ,K) = wI(θ, âI(θ, µ(K)), λ)−
(
λEΠMI (θ, âI(θ, µ(K)) +K
)
(13)
with
∂EŴI(θ, λ,K)
∂K
= − (1 + µ(K))
Now note that ∆̂I(K) > 0 for K → 0, since EΠMI (θ, âI(θ, µ = 0)) > K and
EWI(θ, âI(θ, µ = 0), .) < EWI(θ, a
∗
I(θ), .) from a
∗
I(θ) = argmaxEWI(θ, aI(θ), .)
and a∗I(θ, λ) = âI(θ, µ = 0). From (11), (13) and Lemma 1, we then have
∂∆̂I(K)
∂K
= −λ+µ(K) ≤ 0. For K ≥ K̂1I , EWI(θ, âI(θ, µ = λ), .) = EWI(θ, a
∗
I(θ, λ), .),
since âI(θ˜, µ = λ) = a
∗
I(θ, λ).
Proof of Lemma 4. The regulator’s problem is
max
aI(θ),ΠMI (θ)
∫ θ
θ
WI(θ, aI (θ) ,Π
M
I (θ), λ,K)dF (θ)
s.t. : (IR− IA), (IR), (IC1), (IC2), (IC − IA)
Constraint (IC − IA) implies that the constraint (IR − IA) is automatically
satisfied and therefore it can be neglected. Neglecting for the moment the
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constraint (IC2), the Lagrangian of the maximization problem becomes
∫ θ
θ
(S(θ,QI(θ, aI)) + λP (θ, aI)q
M(θ, aI) + λaIq
R(θ, aI)
−λqM(θ, aI)
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
+ νqM(θ, aI)
1− F (θ)−Υθ<θ0
f(θ)
− (ν + 1)K)dF (θ)
Since the function is strictly concave and the constraint (IC − IA) is linear
in aI and in K, the problem is convex with an unique solution. Maximization
w.r.t. a yields
−(1 + 10λ)a˜I(.)− θ + 5λθ − 3λ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
+ 3ν
1− F (θ)−Υθ<θ0
f(θ)
= 0
where SOC and constraint (IC2) are satisfied provided that−32+5λ−3λ
∂
∂θ
(1−F (θ)
f(θ) )+
3ν ∂
∂θ
(
1−F (θ)−Υθ<θ0
f(θ) ) ≥ 0.
(i) Now, let us take the case where the (IC − IA) is slacking at the solution
to the maximization program, and thus ν(K) = 0. From the (IR− IA) and the
(IC − IA) it follows that (IR− IA) cannot be binding. Thus when ν(K) = 0,
we have µ = 0, and we obtain that for all K ≤ K˜I , where K˜I = EΠ̂MI (θ, µ =
0)−Π̂MI (θ0, µ = 0) =
∂2ΠM
I
(θ,µ)
∂2θ
σ2
2 =
1
6(1+
∂â
I
(θ,µ=0)
∂θ
)σ2, the optimal mechanism
is the same as under observable information. Comparing K˜I with K̂0I from
Lemma 1, we have K˜I < K̂0I . Instead for K > K˜I the (IC − IA) constraint is
binding and the (IR− IA) can be neglected.
(ii) Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, we have ν(K) ≤
λ.We now show that µ(K) ≤ ν(K).for all K > K˜I Suppose by contradiction
that there exists a K > K˜I , denoted by K0, such that µ(K0) > ν(K0). Then
since ν(K) > µ(K) = 0 for K ≤ K̂0I , µ
′(K), ν′(K) ≥ 0 and µ′′(K), ν′′(K) = 0
for all K, it follows that µ(K) ≥ ν(K) for all K ≥ K0 , and that the level of K
such that µ(K) = λ, is smaller than the level of K such that ν(K) = λ. Take
therefore a K where ν(K) < λ and µ(K) = λ. From (IR− IA), substituting for
âI (µ = λ) we have
∫ θ
θ
θ + θ(5λ−1)1+10λ
3
(1− F (θ))d(θ) = K,
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whilst from (ICL− IA), substituting for a˜I (ν < λ)
∫ θ0
θ
−F (θ)
θ + θ(5λ−1)1+10λ −
3
1+10λ
(
λ
1−F (θ)
f(θ) + ν(K)
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
3
dθ+
∫ θ
θ0
θ + θ(5λ−1)1+10λ −
3(λ−ν(K))
1+10λ
1−F (θ)
f(θ)
3
(1−F (θ))dθ =
and it is immediate that the LHS of the (IR− IA) is greater than the LHS of
(IC − IA) implying that it cannot be that they are both binding for that level
of K 
Proof of Lemma 5. The maximum value function is given by
EW˜I(θ, λ,K) = EwI(θ, a˜I(θ, ν(K)), λ)− λEΠ
M
I (θ, a˜I(θ, ν(K))−K
with
∂EW˜I(θ, λ,K)
∂K
= − (1 + ν(K))
and from Lemmas 1 and 4 we have: EŴI(.) = EW˜I(.) for K ≤ K˜I and K˜∗I ∈
(K˜I ,K∗I (λ)). For K ∈ (K˜I , K˜
∗
I ),
∂EŴI(.)
∂K
− ∂EW˜I(.)
∂K
= −µ(K) + ν(K), where
µ(K) = 0 for all K ≤ K̂0I , µ(K), ν(K) ≤ λ and µ(K) ≤ ν(K) for all K.
Since µ(K) = λ for all K ≥ K̂1I , then the level of K such that ν(K) = λ is a
K ∈ (K˜I , K̂1I ]. From this we have
∂∆˜I
∂K
=


ν(K) > 0 for K ∈ (K˜I , K̂0I ]
−µ(K) + ν(K) > 0 for K ∈ (K̂0I , K̂
1
I )
−λ+ λ = 0 for K ∈
[
K̂1I , K˜
∗
I
)
−1− λ for K ∈
[
K˜∗I ,K
∗
I (λ)
]
if K˜∗I > K̂
1
I . The remaining cases are qualitatively similar.
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) From Proposition 1 λ ≤ λ∗ implies K∗S(λ) ≥
K∗I (λ). Then from Lemmas 5 and 7 we have: ∆˜I(K)− ∆˜S(K) = −∆˜S(K) < 0
for all K ≤ K˜I and for K ∈ (K
∗
I (λ),K
∗
S(λ)), whilst ∆˜I(K) − ∆˜S(K) = 0
for K ≥ K∗S(λ). Then, since the functions ∆˜I(K) and ∆˜S(K) are continuous
and ∂
∂K
(∆˜I(K) − ∆˜S(K)) is non-negative for all K ∈ (K˜I ,K∗I (λ)), therefore
∆˜I(K) − ∆˜S(K) < 0 for all K. (ii) Similar reasoning proves the result when
K∗S(λ) < K
∗
I (λ). 
Proof of Proposition 4. It follows from (9).
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